Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Meaning

 (the English translation of "Filsafat Makna Wittgenstein" posted on Linguastudia, October 2, 2015)

I. Introduction
Since the dawn of civilization, humans have always sought to give meaning or significance to every aspect of their lives, to their experiences, and to what they perceive through their senses. This endeavor to find meaning is realized through language, which simultaneously serves as a tool for philosophy. Therefore, those who initially utilized meaning to analyze ideas or express experiences through language were philosophers, although later, meaning as an object of study became primarily discussed in semantics.

The development of the history of philosophy itself has been characterized by the clash of ideas among philosophers. In this regard, history indirectly teaches us about the origins of philosophical issues with their various peculiarities, each marked by its respective period. One period reacts to the previous period, either correcting or adding aspects considered important (Mustansyir, 1988:56).

A similar development applies to the effort to examine meaning in language. Philosophers who initially studied it were often countered by subsequent philosophers. More uniquely, there exists a philosopher who analyzed meaning in language during one period and later critiqued or contradicted his own thoughts in another period. This philosopher is Ludwig Wittgenstein.

This academic article discusses the development of Wittgenstein's thoughts in examining meaning. The main problem explored is: what are Wittgenstein's ideas about meaning, and how did they evolve? This issue will be approached by referencing materials that illustrate Wittgenstein's thought process about language, particularly concerning meaning.

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II. About Ludwig Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein was a philosopher of Jewish descent from Austria. He was born in Vienna on April 26, 1889, as the youngest of eight children. In 1906, Wittgenstein began studying at a technical college in Berlin. Two years later, he continued his technical studies in Manchester, where he conducted research in aeronautical engineering, particularly on jet engines and propellers. Since propeller design required substantial mathematical knowledge, his interest increasingly shifted toward mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics.

In 1911, G. Frege, a mathematician, advised him to study philosophy under Bertrand Russell at the University of Cambridge. There, Wittgenstein began his career as a philosopher. He later became renowned as a prominent professor of philosophy at the university, although he resigned from his professorship in 1947. Wittgenstein's two most recognized works are Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. On April 29, 1951, he died of cancer in Cambridge after two years of illness (Bertens, 2001:41-43).

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III. Wittgenstein's First Period: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Being a student and friend of Bertrand Russell led Wittgenstein to follow the philosophical tradition of Russell’s analytic philosophy. Russell was particularly famous for his theory of logical atomism, which significantly influenced Wittgenstein's first major work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

a. Russell’s Logical Atomism
Before delving deeper into Tractatus, it is essential to discuss Russell's logical atomism. There are three primary philosophical objectives of Russell's logical atomism (Hidayat, 2009:48):

1. Philosophy aims to reduce all knowledge to the most concise and simple language. This goal is to formulate a view that eventually synthesizes ideas.
2. Philosophy must connect logic and mathematics. For Russell, all mathematics can be reduced to a few logical principles. He advocated against separating exact sciences and the humanities in education, emphasizing the importance of logic and grammar as fundamental to both language and mathematics.
3. Philosophy must refer to linguistic analysis. This is the pinnacle of Russell’s philosophy: to seek true knowledge through proper analysis.

In essence, all of Russell's philosophy revolves around logical language. He believed logical language greatly aids linguistic analysis, asserting that techniques based on logical language better reflect the relationship between language structure and reality structure.

Russell's analytic philosophy and theory of logical atomism significantly influenced Wittgenstein's first major work, despite slight differences in their approaches.

b. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: Meaning is Picture
Initially, Tractatus was Wittgenstein's German manuscript titled Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlungen, published in the journal Annalen der Naturphilosophie (1921). Written during World War I—while Wittgenstein was stationed at the Eastern and Southern fronts and even while imprisoned by the Italian army—it was later published in 1922 as a bilingual book in German and English, titled Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlungen and Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wibowo, 2011:21).

The work opens with a preface by Bertrand Russell himself, wherein Wittgenstein immediately critiques everyday language—opposing logical language—which he saw as a cause of philosophical confusion among his predecessors:

"In ordinary language, the same word often has different meanings, which apply to different symbols… Consequently, fundamental confusion easily arises in the entire philosophy."
(Wittgenstein, 1922:35-36)

For Wittgenstein, the confusion in philosophical language arises from philosophers’ arbitrary use of language, ignoring the rules of thought as shown in logic (Mustansyir, 1988:62).

"Most propositions and questions posed about philosophical problems are not false but nonsensical. Hence, we cannot answer such questions but only reveal their nonsensicality. Most philosophical questions and propositions arise from our lack of understanding of the logic of our language."
(Wittgenstein, 1922:39)

As a solution, Wittgenstein proposed his first philosophical theory of meaning: "meaning is picture." The essence of this theory is the idea that there is an absolute and close relationship between language (the symbolic world) and the factual world outside of language.

Language acquires meaning only when used to depict factual states of affairs. Wittgenstein concluded that all language could be formulated into a perfect logical language (Hidayat, 2009:73).

IV. Wittgenstein’s Second Period: Philosophical Investigations
After completing Tractatus, Wittgenstein considered that his work had solved all philosophical problems related to meaning. However, after several years away from philosophical writing and reflection, he began to criticize his earlier views and started developing a new perspective on language and meaning.

In his later period, Wittgenstein expressed these criticisms and new ideas in his second major work, Philosophical Investigations. This book was published posthumously in 1953, two years after his death.

a. Criticism of Tractatus
Wittgenstein criticized his earlier notion that meaning is a direct correlation between language and the world, as proposed in Tractatus. He found that this view oversimplified the complexity of language. According to Wittgenstein in his later period, meaning is not just a rigid connection to reality but something shaped by how language is used in various contexts.

"The meaning of a word is its use in the language."
(Wittgenstein, 1953: §43)

With this statement, Wittgenstein introduced the idea that the meaning of words arises from their usage within specific "language games."

b. Language Games and Forms of Life
The concept of language games is central to Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. He argued that language is not a singular system with fixed rules but consists of many "games" with their own rules, depending on the context of their use. Examples include giving orders, making requests, describing events, and storytelling.

For Wittgenstein, language games are diverse, and the rules governing them depend on their purpose and context. This understanding led him to reject the idea of a perfect, logical language as proposed in Tractatus.

Language games are deeply rooted in "forms of life"—the cultural and social contexts within which people use language. In this sense, language cannot be divorced from the everyday practices and activities of human life.

c. Private Language Argument
One of Wittgenstein's most famous arguments in Philosophical Investigations is the private language argument. He challenged the idea that language could be entirely private, existing only in the mind of an individual.

Wittgenstein argued that language is inherently social and depends on shared practices and public criteria. A private language, known only to a single individual, would lack the external standards needed to determine meaning and would, therefore, be nonsensical.

d. Meaning as Use
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein emphasized the practical and functional aspects of language. He argued that meaning is not something abstract or fixed but emerges from how words are used in real-life situations.

This shift from a rigid, logical view of language to a more flexible, usage-based understanding marked a significant departure from his earlier views in Tractatus.

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V. Conclusion
The evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought reflects his journey from a rigid, logical view of language to a more practical, contextual understanding. In his first period, represented by Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein viewed language as a picture of reality, where meaning arises from a direct correspondence between words and facts.

However, in his later period, as expressed in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected this view and developed a new perspective: meaning is determined by use, and language is shaped by the various "games" people play in their everyday lives.

The shift in Wittgenstein’s philosophy highlights the complexity of language and its deep connection to human activities and social contexts. His contributions remain influential in both philosophy and linguistics, offering valuable insights into the nature of meaning and communication.

Bibliography

Allan, Keith. 1986. Linguistic Meaning (Volume One). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bertens, K. 2002. Filsafat Barat Kontemporer: Inggris-Jerman. Jakarta: Gramedia.

Hadiwijono, Harun, Dr. Sari Sejarah Filsafat Barat 1. Yogyakarta: Penerbit Kanisius.

Hidayat, Asep Ahmad. 2009. Filsafat Bahasa: Mengungkap Hakikat Bahasa, Makna dan Tanda. Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya.

Mustansyir, Rizal, Drs. 1988. Filsafat Bahasa: Aneka Masalah Arti dan Upaya Pemecahannya. Jakarta: PT. Prima Karya.

Strawson, P.F. 1969. “Meaning and Truth” dalam Martinich, A.P. (ed.). 1996. The Philosophy of Language (Third Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wibowo, Wahyu, Dr. 2011. Linguistik Fenomenologis John Langshaw Austin: Ketika Tuturan Berarti Tindakan. Jakarta: Bidik-Phronesis Publishing.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations (trans.: G.E.M. Anscombe). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 

Speech Act Theory in J.L. Austin's Phenomenology Linguistics

(the English translation of  "Teori Tindak Tutur dalam Linguistik Fenomenologi J.L. Austin", posted on Linguastudia, October 2nd, 2015) 

Introduction

A person’s orientation towards life can often be assessed through their style of language, whether in everyday conversations or more formal situations. The language style in question is not merely evaluated from a technical standpoint, such as word choice, morphology, or phonology. What is equally important are the meanings and contexts presented by the speaker in their utterances. This is where language can be philosophically analyzed.

Throughout the history of philosophy, several philosophers have studied language from various aspects. However, one philosopher particularly focused on examining the philosophy of everyday language: John Langshaw Austin from Oxford University, England. Through his phenomenological linguistics, Austin analyzed language philosophically through human speech acts, leading to his Speech Act Theory.

This paper discusses Austin’s Speech Act Theory. The discussion begins with the history of the philosophy of language, explores Austin’s theory, and concludes with its application.

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I. Philosophy of Language and Phenomenological Linguistics
The early 20th century saw the emergence of the philosophy of language, viewed as one of the most phenomenal schools of thought and categorized as logocentric due to its focus on language as the center of philosophical discourse. Based on the principle that linguistic expressions must align with their use and rules, the philosophy of language is considered to have a critical and neutral method, capable of clearing prior philosophers’ language of circular, unclear, and detached thinking, especially from societal realities.

Additionally, the philosophy of language is regarded as having a unique method in philosophy, as it is not only used to explore the essence of language but also as a theory to explain, elucidate, and test the truth of linguistic expressions. (Wibowo, 2011:4) Among the prominent philosophers who significantly contributed to the development of this field were Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for modern philosophy of language, while Austin, his student, carried it forward. To understand Austin’s thoughts, it is necessary first to explore Wittgenstein’s life, works, and ideas.

a. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Life and Works
Ludwig Wittgenstein, an Austrian philosopher of Jewish descent, was born in Vienna on April 26, 1889, as the youngest of eight children. In 1906, Wittgenstein began his studies at a technical school in Berlin and later pursued aeronautical engineering in Manchester. His research in jet engines and propellers sparked an interest in mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics.

In 1911, G. Frege, a mathematician, advised him to study philosophy under Bertrand Russell at Cambridge University. There, Wittgenstein began his career as a philosopher, eventually becoming a renowned professor of philosophy, though he resigned from this position in 1947. His most notable works are Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein passed away on April 29, 1951, in Cambridge from cancer, after battling the illness for two years. (Bertens, 2001:41-43)

b. Wittgenstein’s Ideas
Wittgenstein’s two major works reflect his primary philosophical ideas, which later influenced J.L. Austin’s philosophy. In Tractatus, Wittgenstein discussed the logic of language. One significant aspect of his exposition was the “picture theory,” which can be regarded as a theory of meaning. Wittgenstein argued that language depicts reality and that meaning is essentially the representation of factual states in reality through language.

In contrast, in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected three assumptions from his earlier theory:

1. That language is used solely to establish factual states of affairs.
2. That sentences derive meaning in one way—depicting factual states.
3. That all types of language can be formulated into a perfect logical language, even if this initially seems challenging.

Wittgenstein suggested that words can be used in many ways, much like tools. Just as there are different tools with different functions, so too are there diverse ways of using language, which he termed “language games.” These language games represent the various ways language is employed, highlighting the need for philosophy to investigate and describe these usages without interfering in their formation. (Bertens, 2001:51-53)

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II. Speech Act Theory According to J.L. Austin
Wittgenstein’s ideas influenced J.L. Austin to some extent, but Austin explored his philosophical path further. This section discusses Austin’s life, works, and his Speech Act Theory.

a. J.L. Austin’s Life and Works
John Langshaw Austin was born on March 26, 1911, in Lancaster, England. He studied classical philology and philosophy at Oxford, where he later became a professor. During World War II, Austin served in the British Intelligence Corps, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Despite publishing very few papers during his lifetime, Austin made a significant impact through his lectures and discussions. Among British philosophers, few were as enthusiastic as Austin in examining ordinary language. He believed that observing language use revealed distinctions and nuances refined over generations by language users to express their thoughts.

Austin emphasized that language use must be connected to the concrete situations in which utterances occur and the phenomena they refer to. This belief underpins his phenomenological linguistics, where phenomena are explained through linguistic analysis. (Bertens, 2002:60-61)

Austin’s major works, published posthumously by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, include:

• Philosophical Papers (1961)
• Sense and Sensibilia (1962)
• How to Do Things with Words (1962)

b. Speech Act Theory
Austin’s theory, detailed in How to Do Things with Words, posits that in saying something, we also perform an action. Speech acts underscore that utterances reflect the speaker’s actions and responsibilities. Speech acts are classified into:

1. Locutionary acts: Utterances conveying definite information, further divided into phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts.
2. Illocutionary acts: Utterances that carry intent, categorized into verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives.
3. Perlocutionary acts: The effect of an utterance on the listener, emphasizing the listener’s response.

Austin argued that linguistic analysis should not stop at understanding the meaning of an utterance but also consider its impact.

III. Application of Speech Act Theory: Laboratory Techniques

After being introduced and presented in various forums and lectures, Austin's Speech Act Theory, as part of phenomenological linguistics, became increasingly recognized and accepted among philosophers and students of the Philosophy of Language at Oxford University. This rapid development can be attributed to the following characteristics of Austin's Philosophy of Language (Wibowo, 2011:63-64):

1. Emphasizing questions about how and in what ways words are used.
2. Highlighting the use of various methods of linguistic analysis as a form of protest against the uniform methodologies of structural linguistics.
3. Stressing the detailed description of language use, as this can help solve many philosophical problems.

By emphasizing the use of ordinary language for philosophical purposes, Austin's Speech Act Theory continues to hold relevance in today's academic and intellectual life. The current era of rapid and global development still offers us paradigmatic freedom and broad intellectual insights. When we are solely preoccupied with proving a general theory that is inherently illusory, we risk losing the values of life that hold primary context in our everyday existence (Wibowo, 2011:51-52).

a. Forms and Steps of Laboratory Techniques

To demonstrate the relevance of Speech Act Theory, Austin developed a method called the laboratory technique. This method is a linguistic analysis approach used to examine the philosophical expressions of earlier philosophers. Austin's main consideration in applying his theory in this method is the critical nature of the language used by philosophers. Philosophers should ideally demonstrate their intelligence by developing and utilizing the richness and diversity found in ordinary language (everyday language) to clearly and distinctly explain existing philosophical problems.

The implementation of the laboratory technique involves forming discussion groups tasked with analyzing the language used by philosophers. The process begins with collecting and investigating specific terms and expressions found in the philosophical texts of past philosophers, then identifying their basis in ordinary language. The final step is drawing conclusions about whether these specific terms and expressions align with the philosopher's intended meaning (Wibowo, 2011:59-60).

b. The Relationship Between Laboratory Techniques, Metaphysics, and Idealism

Austin’s laboratory technique becomes particularly evident when applied to metaphysical or idealist thinking, which regards a “second world” as having a higher degree of reality and therefore measurable through the senses. Austin examined a series of terms that idealists claimed encapsulated all of reality, such as "spirit," "matter," "truth," "transcendence," and "immanence." According to Austin, these metaphysical and idealist terms do not relate to matters of truth or falsehood but are entirely meaningless.

Thus, Austin emphasized that language should not mislead philosophical inquiry but instead be viewed as a source of knowledge. In line with this, Austin explored the relationship between perception and language by testing the doctrine that humans never directly experience material objects but perceive them through sensory data.

From this perspective, Austin argued that truth depends greatly on the situation in which something is presented. In other words, what is considered true is highly dependent on the concrete situation in which a word, expression, or sentence is uttered. Related to this, Austin highlighted that philosophical errors often arise from misinterpretations absorbed through sensory data.

These errors are a logical consequence of the vast and complex nature of philosophical thought, particularly when approached using a single method. Such an approach often leads to deadlocks for philosophers in solving philosophical problems related to specific expressions, such as "freedom," "truth," or "human personality." Consequently, the laboratory technique is seen as highly systematic, more accurate, and holistic, as it has proven capable of analyzing the meaning of words, expressions, and syntactic forms in relation to the writer's intent (Wibowo, 2011:60-62).

Conclusion

Austin’s Speech Act Theory offers significant contributions to both the philosophy of language and linguistics. Its emphasis on the use of everyday language, along with the analysis of how language functions in its specific contexts, provides a philosophical method that is not only accessible but also applicable in broader intellectual realms.

Austin’s exploration of language as a source of knowledge, rather than a source of error, shifts the focus from abstract metaphysical questions to the concrete realities embedded in everyday communication. Through this lens, philosophy gains a more practical approach to understanding and solving problems in human discourse.

This work not only enriches our comprehension of the relationship between language, thought, and reality but also paves the way for further investigations into how language functions as a tool for human interaction and knowledge-sharing. Austin’s Speech Act Theory remains a vital foundation for studies in contemporary linguistics, philosophy, and other humanities disciplines.

Bibliography

Austin, J.L. 1955. How To Do Things With Words. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Bertens, K. 2002. Filsafat Barat Kontemporer: Inggris-Jerman. Jakarta: Gramedia.

Liberman, Alvin M. and Whalen, Doug H. May 2000. On The Relation of Speech to Languange in “Trends of Cognitive Science Vol. 4 Ed. 5”.

Longworth, Guy. 2010. J. L. Austin (1911-1960). University of Warwick.

Parker, Frank. 1986. Linguistics For Non-Linguists. London: Talyor & Francis. Ltd.

Wibowo, Wahyu. 2011. Linguistik Fenomenologis John Langshaw Austin: Ketika Tuturan Berarti Tindakan. Jakarta: Bidik-Phronesis Publishing